III. Bringing the army on a military position

Mobilization of Prussian army carried out in an extremely deserving special attention to seriously developed the system, resulting in special situations called: «Mobilmahungs Plan», ie a plan to bring the army in the war. The plan this year issued a military ministry - in principal terms, but with precision, day after day, indicated that must be done each part and each managed to bring the army in the war. Under the plan, each of the commanders of military districts territorial hull is a more detailed timetable, exactly the same every day, what should be done every part of the district, to bring it to martial law.
In doing so, let us say that such a task is not easy and requires special diligence and accuracy considerations. Since the announcement of martial law, shelves have to give up to 30% of its officers as instructors in landvernye battalions, and for the establishment of reserve and garrison parts, as well as for the new headquarters and a military government. In addition to these 30% have appointed a significant number of officers in different time travel: for reservists, gathering in the company yards Landver, tap them to be part of the troops and receiving horses. The correct collection of people reserve and Landver ensured particularly accurate reference lists of county, in landvernyh company yards. As for the horses needed to staff the cavalry and artillery parts, then the case in Prussia there is worthy of note the manner in which the force, bringing in the army in the war, the province are required to stand for a fee, known number of horses that are selected from Cash number of special commission composed of cavalry officers and veterinary doctors.
All the items in which a requisition horses, named in the mobilization, which also states - where, exactly, each of the troops should be seconded officers to select horses.
It is a complex process of staffing up to martial law and the establishment of reserves and Landver greatly facilitated by the fact that each of the troops has a permanent area of acquisition and permanent location, and that all the warehouses of weapons, ammunition and uniforms were in the parts of all the number of people , Which relies in part on the military each time.
All private orders to bring the army in the war, the main reason which indicates to mobilize issued a military ministry, made the district headquarters, but because to successfully carry out this task in a country where the army during peacetime only in the skills necessary to local military Administration was well developed and would be able to produce all the necessary operations for the staffing, equipment and weapons the troops are not seeking, each time by one or another subject to special authorization from the military ministry.
In this respect the territorial Prussian military system is a means to rapidly bring the army in the war.
On the objection that such a system is adopted, mainly in the types may quickly bring the army in the war, too costly for a country - can be answered only that the standing army and is exactly the same conditions: - can take dozens of years, the whole peace time before it would need.
By bringing in the District of martial law, the district commander or acts trip with current-in-Chief, or passes over the heads of another, the newly appointed generals, and he remains in the district. In both cases, the District headquarters stands on a march from mobilized parts and replace it formed a new headquarters, which comes only a few officials from the headquarters in his campaign.
According to statement from the district mobilized parts troops remaining commander of the district takes its zavedyvanie all economic agencies in the district, and all reserve and garrison troops, play, as will be explained below, a very important role in wartime 1.
Regarding the cabinet organization, in Prussia, there are different views. Many people believe that real military unit - there is division, which has a membership of troops all three deliveries of arms, without reciprocal action which can not be won 2 and that the Corps, to a large number of its combat units, not infrequently have to split up, separating the different parts to independent action, or to other groups, to enhance their commanders. Thus, in this campaign, 4 and 11 Prussian corps, as well as connected, initially, into one body and Baden vyurtembergskuyu division had used separately for division 3.
Similarly, we see that, with the army in the war, had not only the transfer of people from one spatial shell in another, but even replace the entire division, for example, 17 division was retained by superiors, General Vogel von Falkenshteyna for the Defense of the northern coast, and replace her, the 11 corps, to which she belonged - appointed 25 division.
Then, after disengagement Baden and vyurtembergskoy divisions of 14 army corps, the latter has been drawn from Baden and 1 landvernoy division; Guards same landvernaya and 4 landvernaya division is not included in the corps.
Moreover, it is not always possible leveraged acquisition of the corps district necessarily people from the reserves of the same district, and very often accounts for some territorial Corps reservists to replenish other local districts. In this campaign, for the replenishment of the 5 Corps had taken people from Silesia, which was manned only 6 corpus; from the province of Pomerania people were on the staffing of not only its shell (2 nd), and several other buildings.
In an ongoing case organization, particularly on the grounds on which it is now accepted in Prussia, ie, that all the shells were the same forces - in two divisions, it is still a considerable inconvenience that when, for military reasons, it is necessary to connect more than two divisions have to form a special army headquarters.
Thus, the army Shteynmetsa at the beginning of the campaign consisted of only two buildings, ie 4 division after the same date Metz and general office Manteyfelya to the north, the army this was also the last 4 division.
It seems that much more convenient this body organization, which would allow trains to increase the shells, according to military circumstances, as well as considerations and with fighting qualities hull commanders, as did Napoleon I.
In 1812 the French army corps have been very different composition, for example, the Davu, who had always intended to individual self-sufficient, there were five divisions in the body, while the body of Rene consisted of two divisions. Sometimes, Napoleon I, even on the day of the battle, the division transferred from one shell in another Borodino battle and one of the corps division Davu was transferred to his body vice Eugenia King, to replace the division Pino, neuspevshey come to the site of the battle.
Among the many debates for and against the system of shells, the current in the Prussian army, we have not had time to hear that this organization is still a major inconvenience that, while small buildings, with certain rules in two divisions - the headquarters of a large army, as for example, Crown Prince of the Prussian army - should be in dealing with offices of numerous separate autonomous parts, which is extremely difficult and increases the work of the headquarters.
So in this war, army headquarters, Crown Prince of Prussian be accounted for when dealing with 2, 5, 6 and 11 Prussian corps, 1 and 2, Bavarian corps, with 17, 22, Guard landvernoyu and vyurtembergskoyu Infantry Division and 2, 3, 4, 6 cavalry divisions, in addition, with the main landmark inspection and other parts and offices.
Then, a drab buildings of a greater number of divisions, for example, from four or five, was on its side, the inconvenience that cases of secondment, for military reasons, from the shells of some parts, will meet more often than it was in this campaign .
Actually, of all that we had heard about the organization of Prussian army corps, should conclude that the most suitable in all respects, a corps of varying strength, according to military circumstances and abilities of those generals who will command these buildings, but it should be. that the members of the corps division were from troops of all three deliveries of weapons and that they have made, if possible, greater autonomy.
In favor of leaving for the division (of course, composed of all three arms deliveries), meaning the largest military unit should be noted that in Prussia, in wartime, case commanders are appointed, usually, those priobrevshie reputation of skilled scholars and practitioners in military affairs And military experience are all known. For such people do not take a long time and is particularly difficult to quickly familiarize themselves with the chiefs of division and regimental commanders of their shells, and with sufficient fidelity to evaluate the dignity of those and other militarily.
Regarding the same destination, in some cases, case commanders mobilized troops districts, those districts nekomandovavshih in times of peace exists in Prussia is believed that the ability of the generals are sometimes quite different: people with all the qualities of military general and are a spark of military genius, often suffer in detail and details of executive education of troops in peacetime. Meanwhile, as these details is primarily developed and fighting as soldiers. On the other hand - many generals, has all qualities of good managers and organizers - people who have the potential to successfully engage in peace time, the case of education army, but which, however, were unable to on the battlefield and not behave soldiers to victory.
Regarding the formation of Staff, as much as armies, and Hull, in this campaign Prussia vykazala all his skill and completely refuted the existing opinion about the special difficulties of the organization designated. After a three-day battle of Metz - 14, 16 and 18 August (N. c), which proved necessary to ensure the north, the movement of the Crown Prince to Paris, the creation of a new army of 12 Saxon, 4 th and Prussian Guards corps, the heads of Crown Prince Saxon - the headquarters of the army was immediately organized, with all officers that are due to army headquarters in Prussia, ie, Chief of Staff, General quartermaster, chief of artillery, engineers, chiefs, chief medical officer and inspector phases, with all their offices. Similarly, no special difficulties, was set up special headquarters Duke Meklenburgskomu, when under his superiors were connected Bavarian Corps Tanna, 17 and 22 Prussian division - the organization of Staff of the Army or the Corps took only two or three days.
From what systematic precision, full knowledge and full precaution compiled Prussian «Mobilmahungs Plan», the best proof that unusual speed and the manner with which have been made to mobilize the troops before this campaign.
July 15 evening, sent a telegram to order the military Minister for bringing the army in the war, 16 of the first day of enforcement Mobilmahungs Plan, and July 26, ie 10 days all the troops have already been given to martial law and at the same time, all railways, moved to the borders of 4.
Thus, it is impossible not to notice that, on the mobilization of all the Prussian army was previously envisaged, deeply designed and calculated. Plan to bring the armies at war and the movement of troops was drawn up before the start of hostilities. All questions and information has already been resolved in advance, and hence could not be any misunderstanding - the time to perform and act.
Let's see now, what has been done in this regard in France, and this look at the brochure, «Des causes qui ont amene la capitulation de Sedan», published, as they say, under the editorship of the Vilgelmsgeeskogo captive. The brochure that, among other things, is as follows: «The Emperor, on his arrival in Metz, July 28, was convinced that the insurmountable obstacles hinder his plan moving through the Rhine and offensive movements against the German army, as mettskaya army, instead they calculated 150 000 PERSON. had only 100 000; in Strasbourg army was 40 000, instead of the anticipated 100 000; in the shell Kanrobera, formed in Chalon, lacked two divisions, above all, all troops were short of weapons, equipment, uniforms and stuff ».
All of this disorder, nedopuskaemaya in the army prepared today not tomorrow go on the offensive and to meet with a strong enemy, explains in the brochure called to the fact that there was no pre-defined: what exactly the items and how routes should follow commands, scheduled for deployment of troops enforceable part, that stores intendantskie, artillery and designation depots were located in different areas, while there was no pre-written schedule of what each of the stores was to receive arms, ammunition and more.
Finally, we must note that in France there is no - as in Prussia - standing territorial hull districts in which division, immediately on completion they are ready for presentation to the first commandment. But French territorial division, without any self-management bodies, which lay to work to bring the army in the war, were forced on all issues concerning the mobilization, contact the defense ministry, which thus was zavaleno work and, of course, was not able to answer a lot of requests and information, not prepared in advance for all measures to bring the army in the war.
As for the separation of France for a few large territories and the subordination of them, military, special marshals and generals - the person they have only a military and political significance, and almost no administration and management.
So, either for offensive or defensive for military action in France, almost nothing was not prepared, despite the fact that the experience of past statements and competent in this respect, individuals, government promptly pointed to the need for sustainable mobilization plan.
General Troshev, so power is now defends Paris, in his famous book «The French army in 1867», Done in time so much noise By these very important shortcomings of the organization of the French army, found those riots and omissions that have accompanied the administration of the French trip armies in the Crimean and Italian campaigns - and that the only word which, in this respect gave defense ministry - was famous débrouillez vous «sort things».
Here are their words of the generals, vykazavshego now, a remarkable talent military organizer:


«The war seemed necessary and took all minds: some require it, while others protested, and - suddenly all these contradictions - war is declared.
«To this minute, dry and by sea, in cars and ships, with the haste and confusion, are shown in motion: formed part of the troops, intendantskie warehouses, food, etc.; zagromozhdaya all the way, they pack in a huge number and quite by chance - in one way or another point. Each group of alighting from the deficiencies in equipment and in a mess, which just might imagine - said: «sort things», and the detachment of lightly traveled meeting at the enemy, with etoyu, a French formula. But that just amazing - the author adds, - was that really dealt with and, more or less ready to engage».


The French army in this war, given the military situation exactly the same way as described Troshev, she acted in a hike in the Crimean and Italian campaigns, with toyu only difference that had not yet understand how the enemy nagryanul huge masses and found everything in unimaginable chaos.